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as terms like 'cause' and 'causal condition' do in ordinary English. It is a philosopher's privilege to use an ordinary term in a highly specialized sense.
If to cause an effect in the Abhidharma means not to obstruct the production of that effect (that is, that dharma), to cause an effect in the Vaisesika system means to be its immediate (and 'unconditional') antecedent. The Vaisesikas speak of a causal substrate or a 'substantial' cause (samavayikarana) which is the substance where the effect occurs (through the relation of inherence). Ordinarily, this is the material cause of an effect, even comparable to the 'material' cause in the fourfold division of Aristotle. But strictly speaking, this is a wider notion in the Vaisesika system, since such 'nonmaterial' substances as the soul and the physical space are said to be causal substrates of suitable effects. For example, a state of consciousness as an event is said to occur in the soul (that is, the person) which is its causal substrate.
All causal conditions other than the causal substrate that are relevant to the effect are classified by the Vaisesikas into two groups: asamavayin cause (nonsubstantial, literally 'noninherent' cause), and the nimitta 'efficient' cause. The former forms an artificial group which includes only qualities (and relational qualities like 'conjunction' samyoga) that inhere in the causal substrate and are causally relevant to the effect.3 For example, color of the threads causes the color of the cloth, or conjunction of different parts of a table causes the table in this manner. The group of 'efficient' cause includes everything else that is causally relevant to the effect in question. Thus, the potter, along with the potter's wheel, rod, water, etc., is called the 'efficient' cause of the effect, pot. Aristotle's notion of the 'efficient' cause, in a liberal interpretation, can match this Vaisesika notion. But nothing like Aristotle's notion of the 'final' cause or the 'formal' cause can be found in the Indian schools.4
The distinction of a 'nonsubstantial' cause from the group of efficient causes seems to be artificial. It was probably based upon the awareness that as long as the effect, the color of a cloth, exists its 'nonsubstantial' cause (that is, the color of the threads) should, like the causal substrate, also exist. But an 'efficient' cause like the potter's wheel may wither away (after the effect is born) without affecting the effect in any way. In other words, the father may die after the son is born, but what inheres in the son's body and limbs must stay as long as the son is alive.5 A notion parallel to that of a 'nonsubstantial' cause of the Vaisesikas is hard to find in the Western tradition.
Concern for a causal notion was fundamental in almost all schools of Indian philosophy. We should remember that philosophic activity in India arose out of the cosmogonic speculations of the Vedas and the Upanisads. The all important business of philosophy was to attempt to discover some simple, unitary cause for the origin of this complex universe. Various alternative theories were propounded from the very early period, as is well evidenced in the passages of the Svetasvatara Upanisad, and in the Nyayasiitra, chapter 4.6 Some of the main views about the original cause of the universe were: (a) time, The Nyaya-Vaisesika school opposed the Samkhya by its doctrine of a-sat-karya-vada, according to which an effect is a new creation, and hence numerically different, from its cause. The description of causation in this school is closer to the commonsense view of a cause. True to the spirit of empiricism, causal relation is described here also as one of invariable sequence. Udayana asserted, in answer to the skepticism about causality, that a causal explanation of an event is needed unless we want to settle for a total accidentality or 'whimsicality' of everything. A particular effect happens at a particular moment, not always. This is what is called the 'temporality' (kadicitkatva) of an effect, and this temporality implies dependence of the effect upon something other than itself. Causal relation is nothing more than this obligatory dependence.11 The Nyaya school rejected also the notion of sakti, 'power', 'efficacy' or 'force', connected with causation. The Mimamsakas, being consistent with the common belief, argued in favor of an efficacious power or sakti present in the cause to produce the effect-a power which can be destroyed by the presence of an 'antidote' (pratibandhaka) and can conceivably be resuscitated by an 'antidote to the antidote' (cf., uttejaka). Thus, fire burns because of its power to burn-a power which either can be destroyed or resuscitated under suitable conditions. While refuting the notion of sakti, Udayana solved the problem presented by the influence of antidotes by boldly asserting that causation implies presence of not only 'positive' causal conditions but also of relevant 'negative' conditions. For a particular effect to happen, the absence of the relevant antidote is also needed as one of its causal conditions.12
The Navyanyaya treatment of causation is interesting in many ways. The notion of invariable sequence is explained as holding between generalities rather than between particular events. Thus, Sasadhara defined a cause as one belonging to a class, individual members of which invariably precede individual members of another class, the relevant effect-class (cf., karyaniyatapurvavrttijarlyatva).13 A potter's wheel is said to be a cause of a particular pot because it belongs to the class of those wheels, members of which are seen to precede invariably the production of members of the pot-class. The notion of invariable sequence is, however, to be derived from experience, from what is called anvaya and vyatireka (seeing cases of association and absence).
Although in rejecting the notion of 'efficacy' or 'power' Nyaya resembled the position of David Hume, the doctrine of invariable sequence was not propounded here exactly in Humean spirit. For Hume, it is only the mind that spreads itself on external objects and conjoins them as cause and effect while nothing really exists between them to be so conjoined.14 This is more like the Buddhist view than the Nyaya view. For Nyaya, invariable sequence is discovered by the mind but it exists between extramental realities like universals or class characters. Perhaps Nyaya shuns the Humean empiricism while it asserts its doctrine of real universals. In fact, although the early NyayaVaisesika doctrine of universal was modified by Navyanyaya, it still maintained that certain class-characters were real in order to explain, among other things, the relation of cause and effect. 5 Thus, it was felt in Navyanyaya that the criterion of invariable sequence was not enough for distinguishing causal conditions of a particular effect. For example, the production of a pot is preceded invariably not simply by the potter's wheel but also the color and circularity of the potter's wheel. But the color of the wheel is immaterial and irrelevant to the production of the pot. To exclude such irrelevant items from being considered as causes of the particular effect in question, such Navyanyaya authors as Sasadhara and Gangesa introduced the notion of what they called ananyathdsiddhatva 'unconditionality'. The invariable presence of the color of the wheel before the pot is produced is conditioned by the presence of the wheel itself, and hence it need not be taken into account while we consider the relevant (causal) conditions for the effect in question. By same token Navyanyaya excludes the cause of a cause from being considered as a cause of a particular effect. This takes care also of a conceivable case where each time a pot is produced on the potter's wheel, a donkey always walks by immediately before the event. Experience of invariable sequence may demand that we construe the two events as causally related. But Nyaya claims that the 'unconditionality' criterion can save the situation since it is possible to find a reasonable explanation of each case of such appearances of a donkey. If such reasonable explanation is found, the donkey's appearance will no longer be an 'unconditional' antecedent. 6 If the Navyanyaya analysis of the causal relation seems to be somewhat Because of the muddle and complexity associated with the notion of 'cause', some modern philosophers (notably Bertrand Russell) despaired of making any sense of the word 'cause', and hence recommended "its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary."'7 The rise of modern theoretical physics, some doctrines of which throw doubt even upon the once universally acclaimed universality principle of causation (the principle that states, "every event must have a cause"), has contributed further to the modern despair about the notion of cause. But whatever may be the situation in theoretical and higher physics, it is almost undeniable that the concept of a cause is quite useful in the common affairs of life, in applied technology, in moral fields, in law and jurisprudence. Thus, I believe a philosopher can hardly afford to be totally indifferent to this concept. It will be enough to point out here that respectable modern philosophers such as A. J. Ayer, R. G. Collingwood, C. J. Ducasse, and G. E. van Wright, have found the concept of causality to be useful.1 8 Modern despair about the notion of cause can partly be ascribed to Hume's rigid demand for the empirical analysis of causation. Hume used the notion of similarity or resemblance in giving an empirical explanation of cause. A cause is defined as "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter."'9 Unfortunately the notion of similarity invites a number of philosophic problems in empiricism. For one thing, an event today must be similar to an event of yesterday in some essential respects in order to be caused by a similar cause. We may recall that Navyanyaya introduced the notion of real universals or class character. To avoid this quandary of empiricism, a follower of Hume might argue that similar effects, in order to have similar causes, must be similar only in certain crucial or relevant respects. It is, however, easy to see that the notion of such "relevance" cannot be explained without resorting to the causal notion, and thus it will involve us in a circularity.
The question of relevance may enter in the discussion of causal relation in another way. If, following Hume, the notion of necessity is completely eliminated and causation is reduced to mere invariable sequence, then, as Thomas Reid pointed out against David Hume, we will have to admit that day is the cause of night and vice versa, since day is seen to be invariably followed The point at issue may be made in the following way. Suppose there is a unique tribe, each adult member of which has produced, after going through the usual tribal training period, a particular craft. This craft is unique to this tribe, and let us assume that no one else on earth has succeeded in producing that craft. Now suppose that each such adult member, after his training period and before producing the craft, has gotten up from bed at 6 A.M. on two succes-sive Sundays. If invariable sequence is enough to establish causal connection, then not only the tribal training period but also their getting up at 6 A.M. on two successive Sundays should be considered causally relevant! In fact, to be true to the Humean spirit of empiricism, one has to accept such an apparently absurd consequence. The question of what is relevant, namely, the training period, and what is not relevant to the production of the craft cannot be decided unless some notion like the Navyanyaya idea of ananyathdsiddhatva is introduced. It may be noted that an Abhidharma Buddhist can nicely tackle the problem here by taking the bull by the horns. As noted earlier, he can claim that when something has been produced nothing that was prior to it was really irrelevant to its production. Vasubandhu exemplified the point as follows: When the village folk have successfully organized a feast without interference from the proverbial village troublemaker, they can say that the success of the feast was owing also to the help of that troublemaker. In other words, when an event is caused, almost everything, through its noninterference, can be causally responsible for it. Thus, the question of excluding irrelevant items from the domain of causation does not arise.
For Navyanyaya, the fact of their getting up at 6 A.M. on two Sunday mornings will be what is called anyathdsiddha 'conditioned otherwise', and hence it cannot be causally relevant. In other words, if we investigated each case separately, we could find in each case reasonable explanation of why that particular adult in that case got up at 6 A.M. on two successive Sunday mornings before the said craft was produced. And such an explanation would reveal that each of these facts was conditioned otherwise, anyathisiddha. In the same way, Navyanyaya would declare that while being dry, that is, the lack of dampness, is a 'negative' causal condition for the matchstick to ignite, but the color of the matchstick is anyathdsiddha, being immaterial to its igniting.22 NOTES 
